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10 Abstract
11 We propose an empirical method for improving food assistance scoring and targeting, which minimizes under-coverage and
12 leakage of food and cash assistance programs. The empirical strategy relies on a joint econometric estimation of food insecurity
13 and economic vulnerability indicators at the household level, using data-driven instead of predetermined quantiles. We apply the
14 method to recent micro data on Syrian refugees in Lebanon, to explore how regional and community-based aggregates can
15 improve the targeting effectiveness of aid programs, notably food aid by the World Food Program in Lebanon. Our results
16 confirm that using regional aggregates are useful for augmenting the Balanced Poverty Accuracy Criterion, and our method
17 performs much better than the current policy in terms of targeting effectiveness and accuracy for economically vulnerable
18 households.
19 Keywords Targeting . Food security . Economic vulnerability . Food aid . Refugees
20
21 1 Introduction
22 A major challenge of food policy consists of targeting, in a
23 cost-effective way, poor households that may be both food
24 insecure and economically vulnerable. An efficient targeting
25 would, in particular, succeed in limiting under-coverage and
26 leakage of food cash assistance programs. When dealing with
27 households’ status of food security and economic welfare as
28 the target of aid policies, it is important to distinguish between
29 the concept of vulnerability and the one of insecurity. In gen-
30 eral, (economic) vulnerability is a measure of the risk a house-
31 hold may drop below some welfare measure (usually, the
32poverty line), while (food) insecurity indicates a current status
33of the household, regarding food access and consumption (see
34Dercon 2006).
35The main objective of this paper is to derive an empirical
36method for improving food assistance scoring and targeting
37systems in situations of budget limitations, which can be used
38by decision makers and analysts. More precisely, we suggest a
39data-driven method for targeting food insecure households,
40using both household and community-level indicators of food
41security and welfare. Our empirical strategy explores how
42different levels of information on households and administra-
43tive (district) average characteristics can be used to reduce
44under-coverage and leakage of food cash assistance programs,
45in order to increase the performance of the food aid system in
46targeting poor households. Such empirical strategy relies on a
47robust, joint estimation of food insecurity and economic vul-
48nerability indicators at the household level, using data-driven
49instead of predetermined quantiles.
50We consider the World Food Programme’s (WFP) food
51assistance system in Lebanon and analyze its scoring and
52targeting system for Syrian refugees in that country. Six years
53into the Syrian crisis, Lebanon hosts just over 1 million Syrian
54refugees, who are registered with the office of the United
55Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), about
5650% of whom are under 15 years of age (WFP, 2016).
57Sequential surveys conducted by United Nations agencies
58have consistently found a large share of Syrian refugees in
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59 Lebanon to be living below the poverty line (71% in 2016), to
60 experience some level of food insecurity and to be adopting
61 coping strategies that involve the depletion of assets and in-
62 curring of debt to cover food, health and rental expenses
63 (WFP, 2016). In response, various humanitarian agencies have
64 established multi-purpose cash assistance programs, in addi-
65 tion to cash-based food assistance and in-kind food assistance
66 targeting vulnerable households.Q3
67 We use original and unique data for our statistical and
68 econometric analysis on micro data collected from refugee
69 households, to evaluate the determinants of food insecu-
70 rity and economic vulnerability. We investigate the empir-
71 ical relationship between food insecurity and economic
72 vulnerability at the household level, by estimating a struc-
73 tural system of simultaneous ordered Probit equations for
74 both indicators.
75 The empirical methodology is based on a multi indi-
76 cator system (proxy means, a point or a scoring system),
77 which contains observable (and easy to verify) household
78 characteristics. This system, devised through statistical
79 analysis, allows prediction of food insecurity scores for
80 the already sampled and remaining refugee population
81 within a well-defined margin of error that reduces
82 targeting inclusion and exclusion errors. This would
83 prove useful in first analyzing the current food security
84 status and the targeting mechanism of refugees using all
85 available data. Second, introducing a model to identify
86 refugee households’ food security status allowing better
87 targeting of the most vulnerable households, with observ-
88 able exogenous indicators most closely correlated with
89 food insecurity. Last, identifying key observable indica-
90 tors, which could help in-depth monitoring through
91 follow-up visits.
92 As described in a survey of food security by Barrett
93 (2002), “effective targeting is fundamental to food aid
94 policy (FAP) design and evaluation, particularly in to-
95 day’s era of shrinking FAP budgets as a proportion of
96 government spending or gross domestic product (p. 58)”.
97 The purpose of cost-effective targeting is to reduce leak-
98 age to unintended beneficiaries and to maximize the pro-
99 portion of poor households effectively participating in the
100 program (Borjas 2004). The literature on targeting catego-
101 ries of populations is mostly dedicated to poverty allevi-
102 ation policies and access to natural resources and energy
103 (water utilities, etc.). Many papers have examined the
104 performance of food stamp programs (in developing
105 countries and mostly in the United States) when the pov-
106 erty status of households is costly to verify and adminis-
107 trative costs may reduce the amount of resources allocated
108 to the poverty intervention (Wilde and Nord 2005; Barrett
109 2002; Besley and Kanbur 1993). When reliable data on
110 household income are difficult to obtain, proxy means test
111 can be considered from a variety of instruments observed
112with low cost, assumed correlated with household welfare
113and difficult to modify by households (Sen 1995; Glewwe
1141992). Moreover, even though poor household registra-
115tion and regular re-certification procedures may increase
116administrative costs dramatically in the short run, their
117impact on improving targeting is likely to be visible in
118the longer run.
119Benfield (2007) considered indicators that may improve
120the performance of a food-stamp policy in Jamaica through
121better targeting by minimizing Type-I and Type-II errors.
122The paper confirms that a policy based on additional indi-
123cators, e.g., on housing conditions and durable goods, may
124perform better in targeting the poor. Another stream in the
125literature concerns spatial patterns of poverty and implica-
126tions for food policies of the spatial distribution of poor
127households in poor/non-poor geographical areas (Minot
128and Baulch 2005; Kam et al. 2005; Amarasinghe et al.
1292005; Elbers et al. 2007; Jaynes et al. 2001; Agostini and
130Brown 2011 Q4). Indeed, among the many factors that explain
131that targeting may not be cost-effective, there is the possi-
132bility that the target group is a spatially dispersed proportion
133of the general population (Barrett 2002). Barrett (2002) dis-
134t inguishes between ICAT (Indicator-Cont ingent
135Administrative Targeting) and self-targeting programs, the
136former relying on screening based on various food security
137indicators (including income and nutritional status) to deter-
138mine program eligibility of households. By contrast, self-
139targeting is designed so that only intended beneficiaries par-
140ticipate on a voluntary basis, with asymmetric information
141issues partly solved through some cost component or a re-
142duction in quality of the good or service. Some empirical
143research suggests that easy-to-collect indicators such as de-
144pendency ratio, rooms per capita, etc. can be fairly effective
145in identifying food-insecure households with some degree of
146cost savings (Haddad et al. 1997; Chung et al. 1997; Lipton
147and Ravallion 1995). See, e.g., Jaynes et al. (2001) for short-
148comings and caveats of such indicator-based targeting
149strategies.
150The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
151details the materials and methods (theoretical and empirical
152methodologies) we employed throughout the analysis. This
153includes the description of the datasets and variables used in
154our empirical application, and the empirical strategy. In par-
155ticular, the specification of the simultaneous ordered Probit
156system of equations for food insecurity and economic vulner-
157ability is presented in detail. Section 3 presents the estimation
158results from the structural system of equations, and the perfor-
159mance of our empirical method in terms of targeting accuracy
160and effectiveness. Such performance analysis entails a com-
161parison of coverage and under-coverage of poor households,
162leakage and targeting differential associated with various
163specifications, including community-level and regional aggre-
164gates. Finally, concluding remarks are in Section 4.
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165 2 Materials and methods
166 2.1 Theoretical model
167 As discussed above, better targeting of poor households may
168 help to attain the objective of poverty alleviation at lower
169 costs, but policy makers are faced with the prohibitive costs
170 associated with the identification of households below the
171 poverty line. The trade-off therefore involves monitoring costs
172 on the one hand, and policy leakage (to non-poor households)
173 on the other, with the general objective of increasing welfare
174 of food insecure and/or economically vulnerable households.
175 To formalize the terms of the trade-off, we introduce a simple
176 model that represents the targeting issue in a stylized food
177 policy.
178 Consider a food-aid planner whose objective is to target
179 poor households with a given cash transfer denoted A (per
180 HH), from a total population of size (N, known). The unit
181 administrative cost of transferring A to a household is denoted
182 τ, the proportion of poor (non-poor) households in the total
183 population is βP (respectively, βNP). Let p1(α) and p2(α) re-
184 spectively denote the probability of under-coverage (not
185 targeting a poor household) and leakage (targeting a non-
186 poor household), which depend on the effort of collecting
187 and treating information on households, denoted α. The cost
188 of effort is F(α) and we assumeQ5
dp1 αð Þ
dα
≤0;
dp2 αð Þ
dα
≤0;
dF αð Þ
dα
> 0: ð1Þ
18990
191
2 For a given level of effort α, the social planner wishes to
193 obtain a particular level of targeting and, therefore, a given
194 level of social welfare as an outcome. We assume the social
195 planner solves this problem by determining both the optimal
196 for effort (α) and the level of cash transfer (A).
197 There are several options the social planner can, in theory,
198 choose from to determine the optimal food policy. A first
199 option for the social planner is to define a proportion of pop-
200 ulation to be assisted, say, βP, and then solves for the optimal
201 level of targeting effort jointly with the unit level of cash
202 transfer. Note that in such a case, targeting is meaningful, at
203 least in the sense defined above, that is, identifying poor
204 households to receive aid. When such an option is selected,
205 households are simply ranked by increasing order of income
206 or wealth and the first NβP receive assistance.
207 A second possibility is that the social planner determines
208 the optimum level of aid per household (i.e., the monetary
209 level of cash transfer) by dividing total budget by the number
210 of poor households,
A* ¼ B−F αð Þð Þ
NτβP
; ð2Þ
2112i.e., accounting for administrative costs. In this case, the min-
213imization problem becomes, after substituting for A∗ and
214using βNP = 1 − βP,
maxα C ¼ B−F αð Þ½   1−p1 αð Þ½ −
1−βP
βP
p2 αð Þ
 
; ð3Þ
2156which gives
∂F αð Þ
∂α
 1−p1 αð Þ½ −
1−βP
βP
p2 αð Þ
 
¼ − B−F αð Þ½   dp1 αð Þ
dα
þ 1−βP
βP
 dp2 αð Þ
dα
 
≥0;
ð4Þ
2178which implies that 1−p1 αð Þ½ f − 1−βPβP p2 αð Þg ≥0, provided the
219cost of effort does not exceed the initial budget, i.e., [B −
220F(α)] ≥ 0. This second option is obviously not relevant when
221the objective is to help poor households reach some poverty
222line level. With such a policy, some assisted households could
223become better off than non-assisted ones, which would intro-
224duce distortions in the distribution of households.
225A third possibility is that the social planner first deter-
226mines exogenously the cash transfer that corresponds to a
227minimum level of food expenditure to ensure food secu-
228rity. For example, some minimum expenditure level can
229be computed given local prices, based on requirements for
230food and nutrient intake provided by international stan-
231dards. More precisely, the social planner would equate
232direct and indirect utility levels
V p; yþ A
 
¼ U FSð Þ; ð5Þ
2334where V(.) and U(.) are indirect (Hicksian) and direct
235(Marshallian) utility functions respectively, p is the vector
236of market prices faced by households, y is exogenous
237income (not depending on cash transfers) and FS is the
238level of food expenditure to guarantee food security.
239Solving for cash transfer in the equation above allows
240the social planner to determine the optimal level of trans-
241fer to reach food security, denoted A∗, given available
242income and price levels. Then, in a second stage, the
243social planner solves the following program:
244
maxα C ¼ A*  τ  N
 βP 1−p1 αð Þ½ −βNPp2 αð Þf g−F αð Þ; ð6Þ
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2456 such that C ≤ B (total budget available). We have
∂F αð Þ
∂α
¼ − A*τNβP
  dp1 αð Þ
dα
þ 1−βP
βP
 dp2 αð Þ
dα
 
: ð7Þ
2478
249
50 In other words, the optimal level of effort to obtain infor-
251 mation about food insecurity through, e.g., additional surveys,
252 is determined when the marginal cost of such effort (on the
253 LHS) equals the marginal benefits of effort in terms of better
254 targeting (on the RHS). Such benefits are a weighted sum of
255 marginal effects (with respect to targeting effort) in under-
256 coverage and leakage probabilities, where the weight is the
257 ratio of the non-poor over the poor proportion of households
258 in the total population. Under such constraint, given a
259 predetermined level of cash transfer per household, the policy
260 maker determines the optimal level of targeting that ultimately
261 determines the proportion of poor households to be provided
262 with assistance.
263 This last policy corresponds to the one employed in prac-
264 tice in our application, and we will consider it in the rest of the
265 paper.
266 When the level of effort tends to infinity, we expect both
267 policy under-coverage and leakage to tend to zero, so that the
268 total cost of the targeting policy would converge to
269
C ¼ A*τNβP
  1þ 1−βP
βP
 0
 
−F αð Þ
¼ A*τNβP
 
−F αð Þ: ð8Þ
2701
272
3 This would violate the condition that C ≤ B if F(α) is large
274 enough. However, a trade-off can be determined by solving
275 the above problem, for a limited budget and expected gains
276 from targeting. In practice, it is essential to be able to identify
277 effective gains from targeting poor households, and compare
278 them with the cost of effort associated with data collection on
279 households. This is achieved by sampling over the target pop-
280 ulation to estimate the proportion of poor households therein,
281 providing an estimate for βP. When the sample includes
282 households benefiting from cash transfers as well, then the
283 probabilities of under-coverage and leakage can also be esti-
284 mated. The empirical analysis of the present paper proposes a
285 system of targeting equations that serve such a purpose by
286 illustrating the way increasing information on households
287 can increase the performance of targeting policies, by reduc-
288 ing probabilities p1(α) and p2(α). To make the connection
289 between the above model and our application, we assume a
290 direct relationship between targeting effort and information
291 collected on the population of households. As information
292 increases through (costly) repeated surveys, the precision on
293 coverage and leakage probabilities also increase in a way
294limited by the trade-off discussed, until the marginal benefit
295of targeting effort equals its marginal cost.
2962.2 Empirical methodology
297In this paper we are interested in analyzing the targeting ef-
298fectiveness of cash transfers with respect to two variables:
299food insecurity and economic vulnerability. As will be shown
300below, both dependent variables are discrete ordered, and they
301are interlinked. This requires a specific empirical estimation
302strategy, which is detailed here.
303Instead of specifying a reduced-form system of equations
304in which both indicators would appear dependent upon the
305same set of socio-economic explanatory variables, we consid-
306er instead a structural specification where food insecurity de-
307pends on economic vulnerability as well. The argument be-
308hind such specification is that it provides a simple way to
309disentangle the effect of socio-economic drivers of food inse-
310curity from the ones (possible in common) that condition wel-
311fare and economic vulnerability. Moreover, with such repre-
312sentation, it is straightforward to simulate the impact of a
313change in income following, e.g., a decrease in the cash trans-
314fer, and its impact on the food insecurity indicator. In any case,
315the recursive representation at the household level is consis-
316tent with the evidence that, even though identical socio-
317economic determinants may jointly explain food insecurity
318and economic vulnerability, the former is also determined by
319the level of economic welfare.
320Let i, i = 1,2,…, N, denote the household index and consid-
321er the general simultaneous-equation model:
n
y*1i ¼ δ1 þ x1iβ1 þ u1i; y*2i ¼ δ2 þ γy*1i þ x2iβ2 þ u2i; ð9Þ
3223where y*1i and y
*
2i are two (continuous) latent variables that can
324be defined as measures of welfare related to income and food
325respectively. They are associated with two observed simulta-
326neous welfare levels (respectively, food insecurity and eco-
327nomic vulnerability) and are assumed to be positive when
328corresponding levels are observed. Vectors of explanatory var-
329iables x1i and x2i may have some common components, u1i
330and u2i are random variables with a correlation coefficient
331between denoted ρ (assumed constant). We assume the fol-
332lowing exogeneity restrictions apply: E(x1iu1i)= E(x2iu2i) =
3330,∀ i..
334Both latent variables typically lie in the real line, as
335both food insecurity and economic vulnerability levels
336may be normalized to correspond to a set of non-
337overlapping intervals with negative and positive values. Let
338S
k
j ¼ ckj−1; ckj
h i
; j ¼ 1; 2;…; J k ; k ¼ 1; 2
n o
denote such
339non-overlapping sets, with ∪ jSkj ¼ R;∀k ¼ 1; 2; ck0 ¼ −∞;
340ckJK ¼ ∞;∀k; and ckj−1≤ckj ;∀k;∀ j.
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341 In the dataset we observe ordered dependent variables:
342 y 1 i = 1 i f y*1i∈S
1
j and y 2 i = 1 i f y
*
2i∈S
2
j ; j ¼ 1; 2;…;
343 J 1; k ¼ 1; 2;…; J 2.
344 From the structural system of Eq. (1), we have:
Prob y*1i∈S
1
j ; y
*
2i∈S
1
k
 
¼ Prob y1i ¼ j; y2i ¼ kð Þ
¼ Prob c1j−1≤y*1i < c1j ; c2k−1≤y*2i < c2k
 
¼ Φ2 c1j−δ1−x1iβ1; θ c2k−γδ1−γx1iβ1−δ2−x2iβ2
 
; ρ
h i
−Φ2 c1j−1−δ1−x1iβ1; θ c
2
k−γδ1−γx1iβ1−δ2−x2iβ2
 
; ρ
h i
−Φ2 c1j−δ1−x1iβ1; θ c
2
k−1−γδ1−γx1iβ1−δ2−x2iβ2
 
; ρ
h i
þΦ2 c1j−1−δ1−x1iβ1; θ c2k−1−γδ1−γx1iβ1−δ2−x2iβ2
 
; ρ
h i
;
ð10Þ
3456 where Φ2(⋅, ⋅ , ⋅) is the bivariate standard normal cumulative
347 distribution function, and θ ¼ 1þ 2γρþ γ2ð Þ−1=2; ρ ¼ θ
348 γ þ ρð Þ :.
349 The expression (2) can be evaluated for any pair of out-
350 comes (j, k) and all contributions of the sort are used to con-
351 struct the log-likelihood of the sample, to obtain consistent
352 Maximum Likelihood estimates of the bivariate ordered
353 Probit (see Sajaia 2007). J1 + J2 − 1 cut off values c
k
j
 
are
354 estimated together with parameters (β1, β2, γ, ρ), but intercept
355 terms δ1 and δ2 are not identified (in fact, cut offs are identified
356 up to a constant term). Parameters in (1) are only identified if
357 we impose exclusion restrictions, that is, at least one variable
358 in x1i should be excluded from x2i. An interesting candidate for
359 such exclusion is an exogenous variable that determines eco-
360 nomic vulnerability but not food insecurity (such as the par-
361 ticular assets possessed by the household, as in the
362 application).
363 Our model specification has economic vulnerability y*1 as
364 an explanatory variable in the equation for food insecurity and
365 this variable is endogenous by construction. If error terms u1
366 and u2 are correlated (ρ ≠ 0), it implies that y*1i is correlated
367 with u2i, and the second equation in the system (1) cannot be
368 estimated independently. In our empirical analysis of joint
369 estimation of food insecurity and economic vulnerability, this
370 endogeneity issue is essential to avoid simultaneity bias in
371 parameter estimates.
372 To test for the endogeneity of y*1i in the equation for y
*
2i, we
373 estimate the structural system of equations by bivariate
374 (ordered) Probit and the Full Information Maximum
375 Likelihood (FIML) method. We then use a Wald Test of γ =
376 0 in the second one, see Sajaia (2007). Note that we do not
377 consider, for the sake of space limitation, an alternative esti-
378 mation method that would consider a bivariate ordered Probit
379applied to the reduced form of the system of equations. Even
380though such specification could be considered to provide us
381with consistent parameter estimates (as long as exogeneity of
382y*2 in the sense defined above is rejected), we are able to obtain
383structural parameter estimates directly by FIML with the bi-
384variate ordered Probit procedure.
385The log-likelihood function over N observations is
386
log L ¼ ∑Ni¼1∑ Jj¼1∑Kk¼1I yi1 ¼ j; yi2 ¼ kð Þlog Prob yi1 ¼ j; yi2 ¼ kð Þ
ð11Þ
3878if observations are identically and independently distributed.
389This may not be the case, in particular when unobserved ran-
390dom effects come in addition to random errors u1 and u2. A
391possibility in this case is to specify the joint distribution of
392such effects and to integrate them out from the following log-
393likelihood:
log L πð Þ ¼ ∫ f yjx; u;πð Þϕ ujμu;Σuð Þdu; ð12Þ
3945where π is the vector of structural parameters, u is the vector of
396random effects with joint distribution defined by the density
397function ϕ(u| μu,Σu). Such integral can be approximated by
398Gauss-Hermite quadrature, see, e.g., Rabe-Hesketh et al.
399(2005) and Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh (2004). We now de-
400scribe the main data sets used byWFP for targeting, as well as
401the ones we use in the paper to construct our food security and
402welfare indicators.
4032.3 Main datasets used
404To deal with an ever-increasing number of refugees reaching
405Lebanon from the Syrian border, international organization
406such as the WFP, the United Nations Children’s Fund
407(UNICEF), and the UNHCR in Lebanon initiated the yearly
408Vulnerability Assessment on Syrian Refugees (VASyR), for
409programmatic purposes (UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP 2015).
410It aims to construct eligibility criteria for targeting beneficia-
411ries using individual data from refugee surveys containing
412both observed and self-reported variables. Based on VASyR,
413WFP in Lebanon developed a vulnerability scoring system
414dedicated to household targeting (see Drummond et al. 2015).
415Household vulnerability is generally defined as the likeli-
416hood of a household to not cover basic needs of all members
417without engaging in irreversible coping strategies due to a lack
418of financial resources (World Food Program 2016). In this
419regard, it is a measure of the risk of moving to a less favorable
420status, and it needs to be distinguished from the food security
421status of the household (a current state that may be affected
422by factors external or internal to the household). This
Targeting mechanisms for cash transfers using regional aggregates
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423 distinction is important to recall here, because the
424 “vulnerability“assessment of VASyR includes both economic
425 vulnerability and food security dimensions, as discussed be-
426 low, whereas our empirical analysis is directed towards two
427 indicators only: food insecurity and economic vulnerability.
428 Eligibility criteria in the formula used by the WFP include
429 indicators of food security and economic vulnerability, as well
430 as self-reported coverage of household basic needs. Eight
431 sector-specific vulnerabilities are included in the WFP vulner-
432 ability scoring system, including food security, economic vul-
433 nerability, education, health, non-food items, protection, shel-
434 ter, etc. A household is classified into one of four vulnerability
435 categories according to each of these eight sectors, and the
436 sector scores are then summed to produce a global vulnerabil-
437 ity score comprised of five vulnerability categories: low, mild,
438 moderate, high and severe.
439 The main datasets used in our paper are detailed below:
440 2.3.1 VASyR 2015
441 The VASyR 2015 (Vulnerability Assessment on Syrian
442 Refugees) is a nationally representative two-stage cluster sur-
443 vey of Syrian refugees living in Lebanon (see World Food
444 Program 2016), conducted in May–June 2015 and includes
445 around 4100 households for an estimated 21,300 individuals.
446 VASyR 2015was used as the main data set to estimate and test
447 improved food security and economic vulnerability indices.
448 The data set was subject to data cleaning (duplicate observa-
449 tions, multiple heads of households, etc.) for a final sample
450 size of 3850 households.
451 2.3.2 ProGres
452 The Profile Global Registration System (ProGres) is the main
453 global database used by the UNHCR and the data provided
454 include all registered refugees in Lebanon (about 1.05 million
455 individuals in October 2015). Although valuable because of
456 its size and the inclusion of key socioeconomic characteristics
457 on refugees, the database does not contain variables measur-
458 ing welfare. Although registration is only voluntary, due to
459 immigration rules in hosting countries and UNHCR proce-
460 dures and incentives to register, most refugees would register
461 at some point in time.
462 The household is considered the main unit of measurement
463 for the VASyR survey. It is defined by WFP as a group of
464 people, who routinely eat out of the same pot, live in the same
465 compound (or physical location), and share the same budget,
466 managed by the head of household. In contrast, the “case” is
467 used by UNHCR to register refugees in the ProGres data base
468 and is defined as: “A processing unit similar to a family head-
469 ed by a Principal Applicant. It comprises (biological and non-
470 biological) sons and daughters up to the age 18 (or 21) years,
471 but also includes first degree family members emotionally
472and/or economically dependent and for whom a living on their
473own and whose ability to function independently in society/in
474the community and/or to pursue an occupation is not granted,
475and/or who require assistance from a caregiver.”1
476WFP’s targeting process starts from blanket coverage and
477then focuses on identifying and removing households and
478individuals who do not need food assistance according to a
479certain vulnerability threshold. UNHCR’s targeting of its un-
480conditional cash transfers moves in the opposite direction by
481focusing on identifying the refugees who are most in need of
482economic assistance, and then expanding coverage as re-
483sources allow and as needy cases are identified.
484The WFP vulnerability scoring system is then applied on
485the households visited using the common multi-agency ques-
486tionnaire (over 90,000 households) and used for targeting pur-
487poses: households are excluded from assistance if they fall
488within the better off vulnerability categories (low, mild, mod-
489erate), and according to a combination of economic consider-
490ations and Multi-functional Team (MFT) revisions.
491There are obvious limitations of the WFP vulnerability
492scoring system, including lengthy and expensive household
493visits and the fact that it includes over 50 variables, some of
494which are duplicated within the score, rendering it difficult to
495use as a desk formula. Finally, the formula includes both input
496and output variables, which would lead to endogeneity prob-
497lems in a desk formula. For example, some of the variables
498used to calculate the WFP vulnerability score include the food
499consumption score and a coping strategies index both of
500which can be considered outcome variables for food security.
501The score also includes input variables such as dependency
502ratio, education, gender of the head of household, members
503with a disability amongst other input variables.
504Appendix 1 details the derivation of the food security indi-
505cator, obtained through a fully data-driven procedure directly
506from individual surveys. The major advantage of our proce-
507dure is that empirical quantiles allow determining empirical
508values that do not depend on external standards that may be
509inconsistent with local conditions. Moreover, in designing our
510indicators, we carefully exclude variables likely to reflect de-
511cisions from households that may depend on other explanato-
512ry variables (the endogeneity problem, see below).
513Table 1 displays the proportion of households classified
514into five groups of vulnerability (regarding food insecurity),
515according to the index derived in Appendix 1.
516Defining food insecurity by a gradient above 4, the propor-
517tion of food insecure households in the VASyR2015 sample is
518around 61%.
519As for economic vulnerability, we consider a welfare-
520dependent variable that proxies economic vulnerability, on a
521set of independent variables that are thought to determine the
1 http://cega.berkeley.edu/assets/miscellaneous_files/35-ABCA_-Targeting_
and_Welfare.pdf
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522 variation in the welfare aggregate. We adopt per capita expen-
523 diture as our welfare aggregate. Economic vulnerability is
524 therefore measured through monthly expenditure per capita
525 in USD. The expenditure aggregate is constructed by sum-
526 ming up 18 self-reported expenditure items from the VASyR
527 questionnaire with a recall period of 30 days. The household
528 aggregate is then divided over the number of household mem-
529 bers. Following the approach used by UNHCR, the upper
530 limit of the per capita expenditure aggregate was restricted
531 to 250 USD to exclude most outliers. As for the food insecu-
532 rity indicator, we construct an ordinal variable based on
533 bootstrapped quantiles of the monthly expenditure per capita,
534 with values from 1 to 9. Quantiles of economic vulnerability
535 are reported in Table 2, as monthly values in USD per capita,
536 together with the corresponding number of households in the
537 sample.
5382.4 Model specification
539Two targeting models are detailed below, ranging from the
540inclusion of ProGres only variables to appending community
541level indicators. Recall that in all model specifications, the
542equation for food insecurity contains the endogenous variable
543y1 (economic vulnerability) as an explanatory variable.
544The first specification with ProGres variables only does not
545require new data collection and uses variables already collect-
546ed from refugees upon registration. The data are also updated
547on a regular basis by UNHCR. For this first model specifica-
548tion, the sets of explanatory variables are
549
550
51
x1 ¼ HH size; homogeneous;Access Phone;HOH education; valuable assets;HHsharesð Þ;
x2 ¼ HH size; homogeneous;HOH education;HHsharesð Þ;
5523
554
555 where HHshares contains empirical proportions of household
556 members related to age, gender, employment and disability
557 status, and education level of the head of household (HOH).
558 Variable homogeneous is introduced to capture the influence
559 of the density of refugees from the same district of origin (in
560 Syria) and living now in the same district (in Lebanon) as the
561 considered household. It is computed as a proportion as well,
562 using the information from ProGres on places of origin and
563 current residence. To capture the role of having a means of
564 communication, we include a dummy variable Access_Phone,
565 equal to 1 if the household has positive expenditures on cell
566 (GSM) or land-line phone(s). The possession by the house-
567 hold of appliances (or other household durable goods) with a
568 significant market value (in case of sale on a local market) is
569 captured by the variable valuable assets. As it is assumed to
570 influence only economic vulnerability and not food insecurity,
571 it does not include appliances that can be used for home
572 cooking, and is not included in the list of variables x2.
573The second specification includes community-specific av-
574erages at the district level, including access to drinking water,
575sanitation status, crowdedness index, share of (as well as of
576heads of) households with chronic disease, share of house-
577holds receiving medical care.
578The list of variables and indicators included in the targeting
579models is included in the tables below. They include house-
580hold (HH) characteristics, shares of members with certain
581characteristics, housing conditions, location characteristics
582and other socio-demographic indicators. Variables are either
583available in VASyR 2015 only or in both VASyR 2015 and
584ProGres. Community level indicators have also been calculat-
585ed based on VASyR 2015 variables and are appended to the
586corresponding cases in ProGres. For example, the share of HH
587living in crowded conditions was calculated for each of the 26
588districts using the VASyR 2015 data set. The calculated share
589was then appended to each case in ProGres by corresponding
590district. Even though the variables needed to calculate
t1:1 Table 1 Proportion of households in VASyR 2015 classified into
categories of vulnerability to food insecurity
t1:2 Lowest to highest vulnerability
to food insecurity
Proportion of households
t1:3 1 – lowest 13.3%
t1:4 2 10.6%
t1:5 3 14.7%
t1:6 4 33.2%
t1:7 5 – highest 28.2%
t2:1Table 2 Economic vulnerability quantiles
t2:2Economic vulnerability
quantile
Value
(USD/month/head)
Observation s
in sample
t2:310% 41.66 269
t2:420% 55.33 328
t2:530% 67.50 458
t2:640% 78.33 500
t2:750% 90.46 633
t2:860% 104.62 552
t2:970% 121.68 511
t2:1080% 146.80 337
t2:1190% 195.38 183
t2:12Average 112.47 3771
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591 community level indicators are not available in ProGres, they
592 can be calculated based on the VASyR 2015 data set or any
593 newer nationally representative sample and appended to cases
594 in ProGres.
595 Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for variables used in
596 the various model specifications.
597 3 Results
598 3.1 Estimation results
599 We now present estimation results for our model specifica-
600 tions with increasing information used to represent simulta-
601 neously food insecurity and economic vulnerability: model (I)
602 with ProGres variables only, and model (II) adding district-
603 level indicators. For each model considered, random effects at
604district level are accounted for, as described above, to evaluate
605the log-likelihood function of the bivariate ordered Probit.
606Parameter estimates are presented in Table 4. To interpret cor-
607rectly the sign of the effect of a given explanatory variable, It
608has to be remembered that a higher value of the dependent
609variable percap_exp_quant corresponds to a lower economic
610vulnerability, while a higher value of the variable fsgradient is
611associated with a higher degree of food insecurity.
612In both model specifications, the exogeneity assumption
613for economic vulnerability in the equation of food insecurity
614is strongly rejected, with a p-value of the Wald test less than
6150.001 in all cases. The level of economic welfare (as measured
616by the empirical quantile of household expenditures per head)
617is negative and significant in all specifications for food inse-
618curity, which was expected. The null hypothesis of no-
619correlation between random terms in the system of equations
620(food insecurity and economic vulnerability), given covariates
t3:1 Table 3 Descriptive statistics of
the samplet3:2 Variable Specification(s) Mean Standard Deviation
t3:3 fsgradient (I), (II), HH 4.9506 2.198
t3:4 percap_exp_quant (I), (II), HH 5.5049 2.8737
t3:5 HHsize (I), (II), HH 5.2099 2.3289
t3:6 HHsize2 (I), (II), HH 32.7195 31.8355
t3:7 homogeneous (I), (II), HH 0.1026 0.0954
t3:8 hoh_education_level = intermediate (I), (II), HH 0.187 0.39
t3:9 hoh_education_level = none (I), (II), HH 0.1577 0.3645
t3:10 hoh_education_level = primary_school (I), (II), HH 0.4379 0.4962
t3:11 hoh_education_level = read_write (I), (II), HH 0.0927 0.2901
t3:12 hoh_education_level = secondary_school (I), (II), HH 0.0732 0.2606
t3:13 hoh_education_level = technical (I), (II), HH 0.0156 0.1239
t3:14 hoh_education_level = university (I), (II), HH 0.0358 0.1859
t3:15 Access_Phone (I), (II), HH 0.8963 0.3048
t3:16 valuable_assets(*) (I), (II), HH 0.9203 0.2709
t3:17 less_than_5_share (I), (II), HH 0.1973 0.1891
t3:18 btw_5_and_17_share (I), (II), HH 0.2904 0.2374
t3:19 btw_51_and_70_share (I), (II), HH 0.0568 0.1521
t3:20 aged_more_than_71_share (I), (II), HH 0.0111 0.0701
t3:21 btw_18_and_50_male_share (I), (II), HH 0.2131 0.183
t3:22 btw_18_and_51_female_share (I), (II), HH 0.2311 0.1477
t3:23 disabled_share (I), (II), HH 0.0277 0.0908
t3:24 water_access_hh_share (II), Dist 0.8422 0.2226
t3:25 drinkingwater_access_hh_share (II), Dist 0.4659 0.2196
t3:26 sanitation_access_hh_share (II), Dist 0.4106 0.2226
t3:27 crowded_hh_share (II), Dist 0.5483 0.0927
t3:28 chronichoh_hh_share (II), Dist 0.2103 0.0672
t3:29 chronic_hh_share (II), Dist 0.4007 0.1003
t3:30 receivehealth_hh_share (II), Dist 0.1049 0.0562
3850 observations. (*) : equation for economic vulnerability only. Specifications are as follows. (I): ProGres
variables only; (II): (I) + district variables. HH and Dist: evaluated at household and district level respectively
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621 and under the random effect specification, is rejected at the 5%
622 level of confidence for model specification (II) (with district
623 variables) but is not rejected for model specification (I).
624The household size is strongly significant and it has a neg-
625ative effect in all model specifications for both equations, and
626it is decreasing and convex in specifications (I) and (II) for
t4:1 Table 4 Estimation results. Simultaneous structural equations, ordered Probit
t4:2 Dep. variable Percap_exp_quant fsgradient
t4:3 (I) (II) (I) (II)
t4:4 Percap_exp_quant – – −0.0773*** −0.0916***
t4:5 – – (10.92) (12.94)
t4:6 HHsize −0.3322*** −0.3566*** −0.1134*** −0.1334***
t4:7 (11.87) (12.69) (4.14) (4.87)
t4:8 HHsize2 0.0158*** 0.0168*** 0.0028 0.0036*
t4:9 (8.28) (8.76) (1.46) (1.90)
t4:10 homogeneous −0.2190 −0.5330*** −0.0636 −0.2383
t4:11 (1.22) (2.93) (0.34) (1.26)
t4:12 hoh_edu1 −0.2769*** −0.3098*** 0.1186 0.0934
t4:13 (2.76) (3.07) (1.22) (0.96)
t4:14 hoh_edu2 −0.5001*** −0.5193*** 0.3182*** 0.3021***
t4:15 (4.90) (5.07) (3.22) (3.05)
t4:16 hoh_edu3 −0.3359*** −0.3841*** 0.1589* 0.1300
t4:17 (3.50) (3.99) (1.72) (1.41)
t4:18 hoh_edu4 −0.3885*** −0.3866*** 0.3264*** 0.3193***
t4:19 (3.61) (3.57) (3.11) (3.04)
t4:20 hoh_edu5 −0.2840** −0.3600*** 0.1496 0.1034
t4:21 (2.56) (3.23) (1.39) (0.96)
t4:22 hoh_edu6 0.0694 −0.0093 0.0959 0.0443
t4:23 (0.42) (0.06) (0.60) (0.28)
t4:24 hoh_edu7 REF REF REF REF
t4:25 Access_Phone 0.6275*** 0.5617*** – –
t4:26 (10.49) (9.35) – –
t4:27 valuable_assets 0.2831*** 0.2789*** – –
t4:28 (4.38) (4.31) – –
t4:29 less_than_5_share 0.3898 0.0540 0.1424 −0.0120
t4:30 btw_5_and_17_share (0.39) (0.05) (0.14) (0.01)
t4:31 btw_51_and_70_share 0.6455 0.3642 0.5532 0.4298
t4:32 aged_more_than_71_share (0.64) (0.36) (0.54) (0.42)
t4:33 btw_18_and_50_male_share 1.4382 1.0899 0.3310 0.1903
t4:34 btw_18_and_51_female_share (1.42) (1.08) (0.33) (0.19)
t4:35 less_than_5_share 1.6759 1.3100 0.6336 0.4870
t4:36 btw_5_and_17_share (1.62) (1.26) (0.61) (0.47)
t4:37 btw_51_and_70_share 2.0983** 1.7359* 0.3456 0.1807
t4:38 aged_more_than_71_share (2.08) (1.72) (0.34) (0.18)
t4:39 btw_18_and_50_male_share 1.1717 0.8970 0.5462 0.4423
t4:40 (1.16) (0.89) (0.54) (0.44)
t4:41 disabled_share −0.3245* −0.3471* 0.2731 0.2654
t4:42 (1.74) (1.85) (1.47) (1.43)
t4:43 Ρ 0.0664 (1.05) 0.2174*** (4.46) LR = 1.07 (p-value = 0.31) LR = 17.61 (p-value = 0.00)
3771 observations. Random effects for districts of origin and destination in all specifications. Specifications are as follows. (I): ProGres variables only;
(II): (I) + district variables. See Appendix Table 12 for list of variables. t-statistics are in parentheses. * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. ρ is the
correlation coefficient between both equations; LR is the Likelihood Ratio test (distributed as a χ2 (1) under the null assumption of independence)
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627 economic vulnerability, while HHsize2 is significant only at
628 the 10% level for food insecurity and specification (II). All
629 else being equal, a larger size of household decreases per head
630 expenditures and it also increases food security. A possible
631 explanation for such finding is that there are economies of
632 scale in food consumption within the household (less food
633 per head for larger households, resulting in a lower food inse-
634 curity index).
635 Let us now turn to the variable homogeneous, measur-
636 ing the extent to which refugees of the same district of
637 origin tend to regroup in the host country (Lebanon). This
638 variable is significant only in the equation for economic
639 vulnerability for the last specification (II) (with district
640 variables), where it is negative, while it does not explain
641 food insecurity. Such a finding indicates that a higher
642 proportion of refugees from the same Syrian district and
643 living now in the same Lebanese district has a negative
644 effect on economic welfare. Hence, to cope with econom-
645 ic vulnerability, the strategy of refugees consisting in liv-
646 ing close to households of the same origin is not improv-
647 ing their economic status (although it does not modify the
648 food insecurity status). A possible interpretation of such
649 result is a negative one: it may well be the heterogeneity
650 of households in terms of origin (in Syria) that is profit-
651 able to refugees, instead of a greater concentration of in-
652 dividuals coming from the same geographical area.
653Consider now education level as a determinant of food
654insecurity and economic vulnerability. The reference for
655education level is the higher category, i.e., university de-
656gree, and all other binary variables for education are to be
657interpreted with respect to this maximum education level.
658Estimation results show that a higher educational level
659(university level being used as reference in both equa-
660tions) tends to decrease economic vulnerability (equiva-
661lently, to increase economic welfare), and it also has a
662negative impact on food insecurity. This is expected, as
663a higher educational level may be associated with a great-
664er ability to cope with changing conditions of access to
665food as well as less economic vulnerability in general.
666The possession of at least one cell phone, captured by
667variable Has_Cell_Phone, has a positive and significant
668effect on economic welfare in both specifications. This
669can be interpreted by the fact that such portable commu-
670nication device is an essential means for accessing infor-
671mation on economic opportunities (e.g., informal work),
672leading to less economic vulnerability.
673The possession of valuable assets in the equation for eco-
674nomic vulnerability is positive and significant (it was omitted
675from the food insecurity equation to achieve identification, as
676was variable Access_Phone). This can illustrate the fact that
677households with valuable assets, that can be sold on formal of
678informal markets or between neighbours, are less vulnerable,
t5:1 Table 5 Targeting effectiveness, food security
t5:2 Food Insecurity
line = (fsgradient = 4)
Coverage of the
food insecure (1)
Under-coverage (2) Leakage (3) Targeting
differential = (1)–(3)
t5:3 Currently assisted 74.23 25.77 38.98 35.25
t5:4 ProGres variables 52.38 47.62 32.76 19.62
t5:5 ProGres + district variables 55.81 44.19 32.40 23.41
Undercoverage is percent of poor individuals that do not receive transfer
Leakage is percent of individuals that receive transfer and are not poor
The targeting differential is the difference between the coverage rate and the participation rate for non-poor
t6:1 Table 6 Targeting effectiveness, economic vulnerability
t6:2 Poverty line = (60% percentile of
HH expenditure, around 114 USD)
Coverage of
the poor (1)
Under-coverage (2) Leakage (3) Targeting
differential = (1)–(3)
t6:3 Currently assisted 81.20 18.80 25.21 55.99
t6:4 ProGres variables 84.60 15.40 19.38 65.32
t6:5 ProGres + district variables 85.66 14.34 18.75 66.91
Undercoverage is percent of poor individuals that do not receive transfer
Leakage is percent of individuals that receive transfer and are not poor
The targeting differential is the difference between the coverage rate and the participation rate for non-poor
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679 such assets being used asmore or less liquid savings. Consider
680 finally demographic characteristics of the household, repre-
681 sented by proportions or shares of household members. The
682 only significant demographic variables (although at the 10 or
683 5% level only) in the equation of percap_exp_quant are the
684 proportion of household members between 51 and 70
685 (btw_51_and_70_sharewith a positive effect) and the propor-
686 tion of disabled household members (disabled_share, with a
687 negative effect). Household shares are not significant in the
688 equation for food insecurity, indicating the recursive nature of
689 such demographic variables, which affect food insecurity only
690 through economic vulnerability.
691 3.2 Targeting effectiveness and accuracy
692 The purpose of this section is to examine the performance of
693 our procedure for improving the targeting of poor and food-
694 insecure households. To do this, we need to evaluate the ef-
695 fectiveness and accuracy of policies using regional and
696 district-level aggregates for targeting, compared with the ac-
697 tual policy of the World Food Program in Lebanon.
698 Consider first the relationship between food insecurity and
699 poverty at the household level. This link is conceptually clear,
700 especially in an urban context where economic access to food
701 (purchasing power) is the dominant factor in food security.
702 Hence, a particular dimension of food insecurity (alongside
703limited availability, low stability and insufficient utilization,
704see Dilley and Boudreau 2001) can be defined as “food pov-
705erty”, that is, the status of a household regarding its access to
706food as a direct function of its purchasing power. Assuming a
707relationship with available income for access to food when
708defining food poverty, then it is expected that food poverty
709and overall poverty can be identified as different points on the
710same scale of income, and that people in need of food would
711be a smaller subset of those in overall poverty.
712Let us first distinguish between individuals living either
713under or above some poverty line that identifies food poverty,
714and which can be defined by the Minimum Expenditure
715Basket (MEB),2 set at 114$ per person per month which in-
716cludes the cost of food plus other needs. However, since we
717are measuring food security and not food poverty with our
718newly developed index, we expect to find some discrepancy
719between food insecure and poor households. And because we
720are using ordered values for economic vulnerability to repre-
721sent quantiles of household expenditures, we can only approx-
722imate such value. In fact, the poverty line discussed above
723corresponds roughly to the 60% quantile of the dependent
724variable, so that we consider all households below such
725quantile in our sample as poor. Note that the 60% quantile in
726consumption expenditure over the whole sample is different in
727general from the value corresponding to 60% of a given
728household’s consumption expenditure.
729As for food insecurity, we consider the fourth gradient value
730of the variable fsgradient as the threshold delimiting food inse-
731curity. To explore the robustness of our method, we also tested
732an alternative food insecurity threshold, by considering the
733third value fsgradient =3 instead of 4. Results regarding food
734insecurity were very similar in terms of targeting accuracy.
735Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8 present the performance of the targeting
736policy using only ProGres or using district-level aggregates as
737well, regarding food insecurity and economic vulnerability.
738Such performance is measured by the effectiveness and the
739accuracy of the targeting policy in both cases, which account
740for coverage, under-coverage and leakage rates of each policy
741(actual, ProGres variables, ProGres and district-level variables).
742A convenient indicator to measure accuracy of the targeting
743policy is the benefits’ incidence. It is the transfer amount re-
744ceived by a group (in this case, poor or food insecure house-
745holds) as a proportion of total transfers received by the popu-
746lation. Although the WFP Vulnerability Score leads to the
747highest percentage of transfers going to poor versus non-poor
748households, all two ProGres models have a higher Balanced
749Poverty Accuracy Criterion (BPAC), defined as Poverty
t7:1 Table 7 Targeting Accuracy, food security
t7:2 Food Insecurity line = (fsgradient = 4) Total Food Insecurity Status
t7:3 FI FS BPAC
t7:4 Currently assisted 100 59.02 40.98 45.81
t7:5 ProGres Variables 100 66.24 33.75 51.38
t7:6 ProGres + district variables 100 66.47 33.52 54.68
Benefits’ incidence is: (Sum of all transfers received by all individuals in
the group)/(Sum of all transfers received by all individuals in the popu-
lation). Aggregated transfer amounts are estimated using household size-
weighted expansion factors
2 The Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) is an index that is used to con-
struct poverty lines in various contexts, including for refugee populations. It is
emerging as a primary index to develop a cost and market based expression of
minimum needs of refugees in any given country. It broadly follows the notion
of a “cost of basic needs approach” as outlined in the World Bank Poverty
Manual from 2005.
t8:1 Table 8 Targeting Accuracy, economic vulnerability
t8:2 Poverty line = (60% percentile of
HH expenditure, around 114 USD)
Total Poverty Status
t8:3 P NP BPAC
t8:4 Currently assisted 100 72.83 27.17 66.42
t8:5 ProGres Variables 100 79.01 20.98 75.03
t8:6 ProGres + district variables 100 80.16 19.83 75.75
In percent. P: poor; NP: non-poor; BPAC: Benefits’ incidence is: (Sum of
all transfers received by all individuals in the group)/(Sum of all transfers
received by all individuals in the population). Aggregated transfer
amounts are estimated using household size-weighted expansion factors
Targeting mechanisms for cash transfers using regional aggregates
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750 Accuracy minus the absolute difference between under-
751 coverage and leakage. The model with ProGres and district-
752 level variables for economic vulnerability has the best perfor-
753 mance in terms of having the highest coverage, lowest leakage,
754 highest percentage of transfers to the poor and highest BPAC.
755 The targeting effectiveness of the economic vulnerability
756 models was much higher than for the food security models
757 (the first model specification only includes variables collected
758 during registration, while the second includes district level
759 variables (geographic aggregates). The coverage rate of poor
760 households reached 84.60% and 85.66% in the economic vul-
761 nerability model (see Table 6), compared with 52.38% and
762 55.81% in both model specifications of the food security mod-
763 el (see Table 5). Likewise, targeting accuracy was better in the
764 economic vulnerability models, where the BPAC reached
765 75.03 and 75.75 compared with 51.38 and 54.68 in the food
766 security model (see Tables 7 and 8).
767 4 Discussion
768 Using recent micro data from Syrian refugees in Lebanon, the
769 paper investigated the empirical relationship between food
770 insecurity and economic vulnerability at the household level.
771 By estimating a system of structural equations for food inse-
772 curity and economic vulnerability, we showed how
773 community-based variables such as population density and
774 homogeneity of refugee households with respect to districts
775 of origin and of arrival (residence) can improve the targeting
776 effectiveness of aid programs, notably food aid. This is partic-
777 ularly important for increasing the performance of food aid
778 policies when budgets are limited and/or decreasing.
779 A major result of interest to policy makers is that regional
780 and community-based aggregates can be used to improve the
781 targeting effectiveness of aid programs, e.g., food aid by the
782 World Food Program dedicated to refugee population. Our
783 results confirm that using such aggregates can augment the
784 Balanced Poverty Accuracy Criterion, specially in our case,
785 in terms of targeting effectiveness and accuracy for
786 economically-vulnerable households.
787 With the cost of construction of aggregate indicators being
788 in general less than individual-level data collection, a more
789 accurate targeting of poor households may help attaining pov-
790 erty alleviation objectives at a lower cost, when policy makers
791 are faced with significant costs of poor households identifica-
792 tion. As for poor and food-insecure households, being better
793 targeted from the start allows them to benefit from a more
794 efficient food aid system by, e.g., optimizing follow-up visits
795 for in-depth monitoring.
796 By helping to reduce under-coverage and leakage of food
797 and cash assistance programs., the empirical procedure con-
798 sidered in this paper can be used for policies based on in-kind
799 as well as on cash transfers, because its purpose is to help
800identifying food-insecure and/or economically-vulnerable
801households, independently from the vector of aid.
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807Appendix 1: Computation of the Food
808Insecurity Indicator
809As part of the overall WFP vulnerability score, the food secu-
810rity sector score is constructed from three variables: food con-
811sumption score, food expenditure share and coping strategies
812index. The resulting score is converted into ordinal classes
813(categories) according to a formula developed by WFP
814VAM.3 This score has been derived through an iterative pro-
815cess, and is based on several endogenous variables, which
816would be problematic in predictive models of food insecurity.
817We reviewed the VASyR dataset and considered all food se-
818curity related variables in the dataset, to be used as potential
819food security outcomes (y) in a targeting formula.
820The following indicators were considered, and were con-
821structed according to standard WFP methods (World Food
822Program 2009):
823– Food Consumption Score (FCS) – a measure of quality of
824food utilization at household level; widely used to estab-
825lish prevalence of food insecurity
826– Child Diet Diversity Score – access to food quality by the
827most vulnerable
828– Coping Strategies Index (CSI) – a measure of household
829economic access to food, food quality and food quantity;
830used in targeting food assistance in various contexts
831– Reduced Coping Strategies Index (rCSI)- cross culturally
832validated measure of access to food
833– Food Expenditure Share – a measure of household eco-
834nomic access to food
835It has been highlighted that reliance on a single measure
836which captures one dimension of food insecurity can misclas-
837sify the food insecure, and that combining indicators can im-
838prove the measurement of food insecurity (see Maxwell et al.
8392013; Jones et al. 2013).
840FCS and dietary diversity tend to capture elements of diet
841quality and diversity, whereas CSI and rCSI reflect quantity or
842sufficiency. Of these, child dietary diversity was not further
843explored as this would have reduced the sample of the dataset
844to households with children under the age of 2 years only. The
845Coping Strategies Index (CSI) asks a series of questions about
3 WFP VAM Targeting verification criteria document
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846 how households manage to cope with a shortfall in food for
847 consumption and consists of a numerical score. It was not
848 possible to construct the CSI according to standard methods
849 as the VASyr 2015 posed the coping strategies questions in a
850 way that does not allow the computation of the full index. The
851 reduced Coping Strategies Index is a subset of the CSI that
852 focuses on five food-related coping strategies and results in a
853 cross-culturally validated tool to assess access to food. As the
854 rCSI has been shown to reflect food insecurity as well as the
855 full CSI, the rCSI was considered instead. Conceptually, we
856 considered food expenditure as an economic determinant of
857 food insecurity and therefore used it to validate the food secu-
858 rity measure rather than as a component of the measure itself.
859 We therefore used FCS and rCSI as proxies of food quality
860 and quantity, and used an empirical approach to derive cut-
861 offs for relative vulnerability to food insecurity within this
862 population, rather than international cut-offs developed for
863 use in acute emergency settings.
864 Using FCS and rCSI as continuous variables, we derived
865 both empirical and bootstrapped quantiles for each of the var-
866 iables. As both of these approaches yielded similar results, we
867 used the bootstrapped data in order not to impose restrictions
868 on quantiles.
869 The simplest approach to combine the two variables was to
870 cross classify these quantiles in the derivation of a food inse-
871curity gradient, as has been done by others elsewhere
872(Maxwell et al. 2013). This cross classification yields a gradi-
873ent of vulnerability to food insecurity. Considering rCSI Q1 to
874be the quantile with lowest coping, and FCSQ1 to be that with
875highest food consumption score, cases falling in the top left
876cell in Table 1 therefore have the lowest vulnerability to food
877insecurity. Conversely, cases falling in the bottom right cell
878(rCSI Q5 and FCS Q5) have the highest vulnerability to food
879insecurity. 80
881In order not to impose arbitrary cut-off lines in classifying
882vulnerability to food insecurity, we tested the food insecurity
883gradient against economic variables conceptualized as deter-
884minants of vulnerability to food insecurity; food expenditure,
885total expenditure, extreme poverty (below SMEB) & overall
886poverty (below MEB).
887Assuming a food insecurity gradient across quantiles of
888rCSI and FCS, leads to 9 levels of vulnerability to food inse-
889curity (along diagonals of Table 1). Table 2 displays average
890food and total monthly household expenditures (in USD),
891proportion of households categorized as poor and extreme
892poor by food insecurity gradient in the sample. Data show
893that, as the food insecurity gradient increases, mean monthly
894food expenditures and total expenditures decrease, while pov-
895erty, extreme poverty and percentage share of food expendi-
896ture increase.
897
898
t9:1 Table 9 Cross classification of bootstrapped quantiles of FCS and rCSI, % of households falling into each category
t9:2 rCSI Q1 rCSI Q2 rCSI Q3 rCSI Q4 rCSI Q5
t9:3 FCS Q1 5.51 2.82 2.58 1.74 2.52
t9:4 FCS Q2 4.98 2.80 3.24 2.53 3.44
t9:5 FCS Q3 5.33 4.08 4.95 4.02 3.62
t9:6 FCS Q4 5.59 3.40 4.28 5.46 3.90
t9:7 FCS Q5 4.76 3.39 4.71 5.22 5.13
t10:1 Table 10 Economic characteristics of households at different levels of the food insecurity gradient
t10:2 Food security
gradient
Percent of
population
Monthly food expenditures
(mean, USD)
p-
value*
Total monthly expenditures
(mean, USD)
p-
value*
Below poverty
line (%)
Below extreme
poverty (%)
t10:3 1 5.51 246.10 651.80 37.6 2.2
t10:4 2 7.8 236.65 0.55 574.80 0.06 51.3 2.9
t10:5 3 10.71 203.40 0.00 500.95 0.03 53.2 8.1
t10:6 4 14.65 177.15 0.01 423.69 0.00 66.5 8.0
t10:7 5 18.16 155.34 0.01 417.43 0.01 73.8 10.2
t10:8 6 15.13 147.92 0.34 347.54 0.12 78.3 16.3
t10:9 7 13.79 133.55 0.07 297.07 0.01 86.0 17.8
t10:10 8 9.12 128.60 0.54 295.18 0.92 87.2 19.5
t10:11 9 5.13 136.19 0.45 310.46 0.51 85.1 12.5
*p-values for differences between means across gradients
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899 Based on an analysis of differences in mean monthly food
900 and total expenditures across gradients, thresholds of vulner-
901ability to food insecurity were derived. In brief, where there
902were significant differences in expenditures across gradients, a
903threshold line was drawn, yielding five categories of vulnera-
904bility to food insecurity. Table 3 displays the cross classifica-
905tion of the bootstrapped quantiles, with thresholds drawn be-
906tween gradients 2 and 3, 3 and 4, 4 and 5, and 6 and 7.
907
908
909
910 Appendix 2
911
t11:1 Table 11 Cross classification of bootstrapped quantiles of FCS and
rCSI, according to gradient thresholds
t11:2 rCSI Q1 rCSI Q2 rCSI Q3 rCSI Q4 rCSI Q5
t11:3 FCS Q1 5.51 2.82 2.58 1.74 2.52
t11:4 FCS Q2 4.98 2.80 3.24 2.53 3.44
t11:5 FCS Q3 5.33 4.08 4.95 4.02 3.62
t11:6 FCS Q4 5.59 3.40 4.28 5.46 3.90
t11:7 FCS Q5 4.76 3.39 4.71 5.22 5.13
t12:1 Table 12 Description of variables
t12:2 Variable Description
t12:3 fsgradient Food Security gradient (ordered 1–9)
t12:4 Percap_exp_quant Household expenditure quantile (1–10)
t12:5 HHsize Number of household members
t12:6 HHsize2 HHsize squared
t12:7 Homogeneous Proportion of sample HH in Lebanese district from
same district of origin in Syria, see text
t12:8 hoh_education_level = intermediate 1 if head of HH education level: intermediate
t12:9 hoh_education_level = none 1 if head of HH education level: none
t12:10 hoh_education_level = primary_school 1 if head of HH education level: primary
t12:11 hoh_education_level = read_write 1 if head of HH education level: read and write
t12:12 hoh_education_level = secondary_school 1 if head of HH education level: secondary
t12:13 hoh_education_level = technical 1 if head of HH education level: technical
t12:14 hoh_education_level = university 1 if head of HH education level: higher
t12:15Access_Phone 1 if HH expenditures on phone(s) are positive
t12:16 valuable_assets 1 if HH possesses valuable assets (durable goods)
t12:17 less_than_5_share Proportion of HH members under 5 years of age
t12:18 btw_5_and_17_share Proportion of HH members aged 5 to 17
t12:19 btw_51_and_70_share Proportion of HH members aged 51 to 70
t12:20 aged_more_than_71_share Proportion of HH members aged >70
t12:21 btw_18_and_50_male_share Proportion of male HH members between 18 and 50
t12:22 btw_18_and_51_female_share Proportion of female HH members between 18 and 50
t12:23 disabled_share Proportion of disabled HH members
t12:24water_access_hh_share Share of HH with access to sufficient amount of water
for drinking, cooking, washing and toilet purposes
t12:25 drinkingwater_access_hh_share Share of HH with access to safe drinking water
t12:26 sanitation_access_hh_share Share of HH with access to flush toilets
t12:27 crowded_hh_share Share of HH living in crowded conditions
t12:28 chronichoh_hh_share Share of HH where Head of HH is chronically ill
t12:29 chronic_hh_share Share of HH who have one or more chronically ill members
t12:30 receivehealth_hh_share Share of HH who receive health care/drugs regularly
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